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A SUGGESTION FOR REVISION OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS *
DONALD R. RICH]BERG t
The primary question presented in considering any revision of the anti-
trust laws is this: How far is it necessary to regulate competition in order
to preserve fair competition? This immediately leads to a second question:
How far can competition be regulated without destroying the essentials of
a competitive system of private enterprise? In order to deal dispassionately
with these questions we must try to eliminate certain prejudices and illusions
which commonly confuse our efforts to think clearly and to discuss candidly
the problems of governmental supervision or control of business operations.
We talk loosely of free competition and free enterprise, as though we
had in mind an ideal of absolute freedom from any political interference
in a "natural" order of things in which producers, distributors and con-
sumers, unhampered by any laws, automatically would produce and ex-
change, in an unrestricted market, a supply of all possible goods and services
equal to the demand, with assurance of a fair exchange between uncoerced
sellers and buyers. But when we examine into the historical facts we find
that no such order of things has ever existed in any large community-and
no such order ever can be established in a modern nation. Disregarding
a host of other causes for an increasing social control of private enterprise,
let us concentrate our attention at the outset on the effect of monopolistic
purposes and practices which develop early in business competition.
An unregulated system of competition paradoxically produces at once
the monopolistic seeds of its own destruction. The stronger competitors
naturally eliminate weaker rivals and, with increasing dominance in the
market, move steadily toward the alternatives of combination into one all-
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and 26th, 1936. at the meeting of the association in Boston.
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powerful organization or agreement among the large surviving units to
maintain profitable prices and for that purpose to allocate production or
areas of distribution. This trend is inevitable because unlimited unregu-
lated competition must result in wasteful duplications of expenditure and
narrow, uncertain profit margins, which any efficient business man, seeking
the obvious goal of secure and satisfactory profits, will try to eliminate.
We can hardly question the conclusion that without some form of anti-
monopoly laws the eventual outcome of trade and industrial operations in
serving the major essential needs of a modem community would be the
concentration of control in organizations of such size and economic strength
that effective competition would become impossible to inaugurate or to
maintain. The trend toward such an outcome is now obvious in those
fields of enterprise where a very large capital investment and far-reaching
organization is essential, thus assuring enormous development losses to any
small enterprise which might attempt to invade a well-occupied field-such
as that of automobile manufacture.
On the other hand where a smafi amount of capital and a compact
efficient organization can quickly establish an effective competition in price
or service, the natural, monopolistic advantages of large scale enterprises
may be balanced by weaknesses inherent in big organizations. Bureaucracy,
red tape, inertia, remote controls, inflexibility and excessive conservatism,
are familiar examples of these weaknesses.
Here enters into our problem the factor of unfair competition develop-
ing both in the abuses of power by big business, evidenced, for example, by
price wars or discriminations, and in those cutthroat practices of little busi-
ness which may defraud the customer as to the quantity'or quality of goods
delivered, and deny to the worker a fair reward for his labor. Thus we find
ourselves confronted with the need for eliminating those methods of compe-
tition which we try to define as "unfair", either because they promote a
monopolistic control of what should be a free market, or because they pro-
mote a freedom to injure others which degrades the processes of production
and exchange into a primitive warfare abhorrent to our standards of civi-
lization.
Up to the present time we have come to accept the need for such laws
as will prevent monopolistic controls and outlaw the most generally dis-
approved forms of unfair competition. But on the whole these laws have
been pretty unsatisfactory both to business men and to the consuming public.
They have imposed a great many uncertain, hampering restraints upon
legitimate business operations; and they have not prevented some of the
most offensive methods of unfair competition. They have not protected
consumers from excessive prices for many essential goods and services,
although consumers have been partly compensated for such overcharges
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by the socially and economically unsound privilege of baying many other
things for less than a reasonable cost of production.
In the anti-trust laws the government imposes a great variety of
poorly defined restraints upon free competition which are theoretically
intended to increase competition.1 Thus, by restraining the liberty of indi-
viduals controlling large economic powers, we seek to preserve the liberty of
individuals of small economic power, and to relieve them from an oppressive
and destructive competition. On the other hand, the government provides
protections as well as restraints for modem, private enterprise-notably
such as protective tariffs to prevent free competition from abroad.
It might be assumed that the laws regulating competition would be
based upon a consistent national economic policy. But when analyzed, we
find they are, in fact, based largely upon conflicts of emotion arising out of
shifting conflicts of temporary economic interests.
We begin, for example, with emotional enthusiasm for large enter-
prises, for mass production, for cheapening the price of things we buy and
the variety of products offered for sale. Under this emotional stimulus
the government encourages large scale industries. Then we find fear arising
among small business men and consumers that these great powerful organi-
zations will destroy the small business man and, having ended his competi-
tion, will be able to exploit the consumer. Also we have the fear of the
workers, fear of increasing regimentation into the service of an economic
power so strong that terms of employment will be dictated and not nego-
tiated.
Out of these fears come demands to restrict the size of private enter-
prises and to restrain the powers of those who control them. There are
demands to protect small business men, workers and consumers, not merely
against abuses of power, but against the possibility of abuses; and many
of these latter demands are impractical because in the creation of great power
lies always the possibility of abuse.
Then further demands arise for a positive rather than a negative con-
trol, in order to compel the payment of better wages, the working of shorter
hours, the reduction of prices, some provision for pensions, unemployment
insurance and other securities for workers against the hazards which are
inevitable in competitive private business.
It becomes more and more apparent to the managers of private business
that their responsibilities and risks are to be increased, while at the same time
their freedom to meet such responsibilities is diminished and impaired. In
this situation charges fly back and forth that private enterprise is unwilling
or unable to fulfill its public obligations; and that the government is pre-
x. See generally, Probst, The Failure of the Sherm Anti-Trust Law (1926) 75 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 122; Note (I93i) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 6o2.
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venting the fulfillment of such obligations by restraining the freedom of
private enterprise.
If we are to deal reasonably and not emotionally with our present busi-
ness problems, we need to face the fact that we have had always a system of
regulated competition; that individual freedom of competition has always
been restricted by government; and that what we must preserve, if we are
to retain a competitive system, is not an absolute individual liberty nor abso-
lutely free competition, but a reasonable freedom of action within a reason-
ably well-defined area of competition.
If, for example, we do not believe that it is socially healthy to compete
in the payment of as low wages as possible, or in the employment of workers
for as long hours as possible, or in the employment of child labor, we need
a defined economic policy based either upon economic considerations, or
moral considerations, or upon both. We generally agree that fraud and
deceit are not only socially undesirable, but that they degrade business and
retard, instead of promoting, the growth of business. We ought to be able
to agree that competition in over worliing and under paying labor has evil
effects both socially and economically. But in seeking to establish such
standards of regulated competition, we face not only practical difficulties,
but the prejudices of those who have been accustomed by tradition to the
enforcement of moral and health requirements by the police power but who
are still convinced that any exercise of a similar power to improve economic
conditions is an undue interference with individual liberty and destructive
of free competition. *
I read recently a typical statement made some time ago by a trusted
adviser of business, who said that the economic worth of a worker can be
determined only by competition. Strictly speaking, this may be true; but
it does not follow that there should be no regulation of the competitive con-
ditions under which economic worth is to be measured. This same man
would agree probably that we should maintain protective tariffs, because
he would not have the economic worth of an American worker measured
by competition with foreign workers living on a very low standard. It is
also a fact that our economy must provide in some way for those who have
no employment, or who are incapable of earning their subsistence. There-
fore, from an economic standpoint those enterprises which do not pay a
subsistence wage must have their workers, either currently or eventually,
supported out of the surplus product of other enterprises. Any intelligently
regulated competition will not permit a competition in wasting human lives
and energy any more than a competition in wasting natural resources.
The great difficulty, however, in governmental regulation is to draw
the line between that minimum amount of necessary regulation which pre-
serves the maximum area of competition and that dangerous expansion of
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regulation which may spread until there is not a sufficient area of compe-
tition left, so that as a result prices and wages will be legally fixed instead of
competitively determined. We had innumerable examples of this difficulty
in the operations of the NRA. When it was sought to raise an actual
rate of 5 or io cents an hour to a minimum of 14 cents an hour, protest was
inevitable that 14 cents an hour itself was an inadequate wage, according to
ethical standards. Yet, as a matter of cold fact, if raising the minimum
wage for this particular service would reduce materially the demand for the
product, the immediate and perhaps the final result would be increased unem-
ployment. But how can we officially sanction an utterly inadequate wage?
The effort to regulate competition in wage payments must clearly be
limited to an effort merely to prevent a competition for which there can
be no social or economic justification; hours too long for efficient work,
or for maintaining the health and decency of living conditions; wages too
low to sustain the necessary cost of maintaining the human machine. Above
these floor levels there is an ample field of competition, just as there is an
ample field for competition in games, wherein the rules prevent the maiming
or crippling of opponents.
There is also a further field for the voluntary regulation of competi-
tion, wherein those engaged in a trade or industry can agree upon higher
floor levels of working conditions and business practices, and can exert the
full force of cooperative action to bring about the general acceptance of
such levels, without attempting to use the compulsory powers of government
to maintain such standards, at least until they have been clearly demon-
strated to be economically sound.
Now, against such efforts of governmental and voluntary private regu-
lation to improve the general standard of living and to increase the pur-
chasing power of some submerged classes of workers, we find the objection
of an economic theory, which, crudely stated, is that increased labor costs
are inevitably followed by increased prices and increased mechanization,
resulting in diminished purchasing power and diminished employment. In
pursuit of this theory, strong arguments are advanced in favor of a price
reduction policy on the apparent assumption that prices can be reduced
without wage reductions and that increased volume of production will supply
more work and eventually more purchasing power.
It seems strange to me that the fallacy of applying either a wage in-
crease or price decrease theory to the entire economic process is not obvious.
It is undoubtedly true that in many instances increased labor costs will
require increased prices. It is also true that in many instances increased
labor costs, although increasing the prices of one group of products will
add to the purchasing power for another group of products and thereby
increase production. It is undoubtedly true that decreased prices of some
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products will increase volume of production and add employment, but it is
also true that decreased prices are absolutely impossible in many other lines
without decreasing wages and diminishing purchasing power.
The one sound principle which it seems easy to state, but difficult to
administer, is the principle of economic balance, which requires decreased
prices for some commodities and increased wages for some workers. The
application of this principle requires a constant readjustment of prices and
wages, which will most fairly and readily take place if all the conflicting
economic interests of management, labor and consumer concerned with
agricultural and industrial production and distribution, are adequately or-
ganized to press for a fair consideration of their needs, with effective
machineries of cooperation and adjustment. These should be encouraged
and may be in part maintained by the government, so that when one economic
interest is being unfairly treated, there will be the probability of readjust-
ment before the entire economic balance is seriously disturbed.
There are today too many public and private regulators of competition
to justify the illusion that we can restori a self-regulating competitive system
by any single or simple program. The effort simply to destroy monopoly
by sweeping prohibitions and intermittent prosecutions has accomplished
and will accomplish little except to add to the difficulties of maintaining, by
cooperative methods, an industrial security protecting alike the interests of
investors and of labor. The effort to regulate wages and hours by law,
unless carefully limited, will move us toward an increasing political control
of industry. The dangers of such increasing political control do not lie
merely in the restraint of individual freedom. They lie also in the difficulty
of finding any tolerable standard for a fair price or a fair wage, except a
competitive standard.
But it should be reasonably clear that the preservation of individual
liberty in the conduct of private enterprise and the maintenance of competi-
tion as a regulator of prices and wages require at the outset an acceptance
of the actualities of our present industrial civilization. We cannot arrive
at a solution by emotional demands for complete individual liberty and
absolutely free competition in a political economic system where social re-
straints on individual freedom and social restraints upon competition are a
long established fact, and where what is needed is not the abolition of all
restraints, but an improvement in their character and consistency.
We need to define the area in which the individual can freely determine
his price policies and wage policies and be free to enter into contractual
arrangements with all those to whom they are voluntarily acceptable.
Within that same area of individual freedom men should be permitted to
cooperate, but they should not be free to coerce others, nor free to exercise
any monopolistic controls of trade or industry unless they are willing to
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submit their affairs to that regulation in the public interest which is neces-
sary when competition, as a regulating force, has been eliminated.
We need definite and defined regulations of competition which are
justified to preserve the health of individuals, the health of society and our
economic well being. But we need also a clear understanding that we are
not substituting regulation for competitionin determining the compensation
to which the worker is entitled for his services, or the owner is- entitled for
the use of his property, or the manager is entitled for his ability to organize
and to direct the conduct of private enterprise.
We can and should maintain the principle that price fixing and wage
fixing and production controls are inconsistent with the competitive system.
But at the same time we can properly insist that competition in reducing
wages or prices may become destructive of the public interest and that pro-
duction controls which individuals always employ separately may some-
times be properly employed by groups, under public supervision, to protect
public interests, as, for example, to prevent the waste of natural resources.
Such questions of public policy should be submitted to the scientific deter-
mination of persons not authorized to regulate wages, prices and production
for the purpose of conforming them to any planned ideal economy, but for
the purpose of preserving the regulative force of competition by restraining
those excesses of competition, which in the end destroy a competitive system.
In final analysis we must maintain a competition in wages, prices and
production if we are to maintain a competitive system. Otherwise we will
move into the need of controlled wages, prices and production-a politically
planned economy-for which we can find nowhere adequate ability, informa-
tion or scientific impartiality. We have no competent substitute for the
automatic regulator of a free purchasing power, which determines wages
and prices and volume of production in a fair competitive system.
Let us agree that we have not yet arrived at a consistent national
economic policy which is, or can be, expressed in law. 2 Consider for ex-
ample our attitude toward monopolies. Regardless of politics we all solemnly
declare that "a private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable". But then
we write laws establishing patent monopolies throughout the business world
with no legal qualifications to prevent intolerable and indefensible abuses of
the powers thus granted to regulate and stifle competition.
We write protective tariffs for the avowed purpose of protecting the
earning power of not only American capital but also American labor-
including, we should assume, agricultural labor. But we have no established
2. One of the most compact expositions of this situation will be found in Mr. Gaskill's
recent book THE REGULATION OF COMPETITION (1936) [See Grismore, Book Review (1936)
84 U. OF PA. L. Ray. gig.]. Another more extended demonstration Will be found by anyone
who reviews without economic or political partisanship the history of the NRA-an effort
which I undertook (with a less .favorable bias than may be assumed) in a book entitled THE
RAINBOW (936).
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and effective policy to insure to the worker and consumer behind that tariff
wall the protection of his standard of living, which the limitation of imports
is intended to provide.
We not only permit, but by constitution and statute we secure, to the
private owners of natural resources, unregulated monopolies of raw ma-
terials which are primary necessities. As a result, if controlled by a few,
these essentials can be slowly sold at high prices; or, if widely held, they
can be recklessly wasted in a scramble for sales at prices insufficient to pay
even a decent wage for the labor employed in their production and dis-
tribution.
We not only permit, but by our corporation laws we encourage, the
development of gigantic artificial persons with tremendous powers and
economic advantages over the individual manufacturer or merchant or farmer
or industrial worker; and then we legislate in haphazard fashion against big
business operations in order that these giants of our own creation may not
trample down all individual enterprise. 8
Consider likewise our lack of any consistent or well defined public
policy in the protection of fair competition. Long, long ago we abandoned
the notion that trading was a game of wits in which there were no moral
obligations on either side. And in recent decades we have looked beyond
the immediate interests of a seller and a buyer and have found a public
interest in the methods of competition employed by sellers in their rivalry
with each other. Still more recently the concept of a public moral interest
in fair trading has been extended to recognition of an equally vital public
economic interest in preventing industrial demoralization, business depres-
sions and social insecurity, of which one contributing cause is cutthroat
competition with its accompanying degradation of labor conditions.
The public economic interest, underlying the Clayton Act,4 was also
concerned with unfair competition because (in the language of Mr. Justice
Brandeis) : "The belief was widespread that the great trusts had acquired
their power, in the main, through destroying or overreaching their weaker
rivals by resort to unfair practices".' Thus the legislative policy embodied
in the creation of the Federal Trade Commission 6 seemed to be a logical
effort to supplement the prohibitions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law 7
with an administrative regulation of competition so as to insure that the
methods employed in selling goods should be fair.
3. Cf. Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 29i U. S. 587
(1934), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 763; In the matter of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Federal
Trade Comm., March 5, i936, 84 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. io3o; Appalachian Coal Inc. v. United
States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933), 8I U. oF PA. L. Ray. ioo6.
4. 38 STAT. 730 (914), i5 U. S. C. A. §§ 12-27, 44; i8 U. S. C. A. §412 (1927); 28
U. S. C. A. §§ 381-383, 386-39o (1928); 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (I92).
5. Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 434 (1920).
6. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 4i-5 (1927).
r. 26 STAT. 2o9 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ i-7, 15 (927).
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The latest and in many ways the most far reaching extension of gov-
ernmental power began with legislation designed to regulate maximum
hours of work,8 minimum wages, 9 the employment of child labor 10 and
other labor conditions, which have a direct economic effect on the produc-
tion as well as the distribution of goods and services. In the early stages
the objectives of such regulations were generally regarded as only moral.
The effort was to remedy the social evils of excessive hours of labor, of
wages insufficient for a decent subsistence, of stunting the growth and
crippling the lives of little children, of subjecting wage-earners to unsanitary
and dangerous conditions of employment. During the great depression,
however, with its extraordinary stimulation of economic thinking, there
arose a strong opinion, even in many conservative groups, that a principal
factor of unfair competition in which there was a public economic interest
was the competition between employers in reducing labor costs by excessive
hours of work, inadequate wages and other measures of social injustice
which had baneful economic consequences in reducing the volume of employ-
ment and purchasing power.
There is today too much controversy among economists, politicians
and organizations of employers and employees over the economic effects of
regulating hours, wages and working conditions to expect any general agree-
ment upon a national economic policy which would go very far in the direc-
tion of eliminating competition in labor costs. Indeed we must recoguize
that this competition is frequently the dominant element in price competi-
tion-so that any comprehensive regulation of labor costs may become in
effect price regulation, and hence profit regulation, and practically force
governmental price fixing and profit fixing. Such a development could
hardly be regarded as a means of preserving a competitive system of private
enterprise.
Thus we are compelled in seeking for any unity of public opinion in
support of a revision of the anti-trust laws to carry forward our concept of
unfair competition with caution and self-restraint both in the field of trade
practices and in the field of employment conditions. Otherwise, regulations
of competition may eliminate the essentials of competition. In regard to
trade practices it was made quite evident in the two year experience of the
NRA that methods of competition which met with the disapproval of a
large majority of those engaged in a particular industry might be supported
as fair and necessary to their survival by a vigorous and militant minority.
In regard to labor practices it was made quite evident that often maximum
8. i5 STAT. 77 (I868) ; 27 STAT. 340 (I892), 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 321-323 (1928).
9. 40 STAT. 96o (ii8).
10. 39 STAT. 675 (igi6), held unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251
(ig8). 40 STAT. 1057, 1138, tit. XII (igig), held unconstitutional in Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
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hours and minimum wages meant entirely different things to employers and
to employees. If the employer could establish a forty hour week, but felt
that forty-eight would be occasionally necessary, he conceived that forty-
eight was logically the maximum. On the other hand the normal forty
hours, or even a possible thirty-six, would be the only definition of maximum
which the employees would regard as sound. In the same way the defini-
tions of a "minimum wage" which developed in debates over code require-
ments would vary from one extreme of the lowest wage which could be
justified on any ground for the lowest paid worker, to the other extreme of
the lowest wage which would be acceptable to a worker of special skill and
long experience.
It is apparent that if we are to revise the present anti-trust laws so
that they may provide a means of carrying out a consistent national economic
policy we face the need of redefining our objectives in the light of a long
and rather sad experience and also of limiting our objectives to those which
will have the vigorous support of well-established public opinion. Just to
indicate the problem let me attempt a few dogmatic conclusions:
i. To maintain a competitive system we must prevent the acquisition
or exercise of any monopolistic power to regulate prices or production,
except where a public monopoly, or a private monopoly under public regu-
lation, is found socially or economically desirable, as in the case of public
utilities.
2. Large business operations are a natural development and, if not
artificially supported by special privileges and political aid, or by unfair
competitive practices, can usually be subjected to effective competition.
3. If size alone gives to large business operations monopolistic power,
there are the alternatives of compelling reduction in size or requiring sub-
mission to such public supervision or regulation as may be necessary to re-
quire adequate service at reasonable prices. Neither alternative should be
excluded by law, because in specific cases one may serve the public interest
far better than the other.
4. Dominance in a trade or industrial field does not necessarily give
monopolistic power because competition within the field or competition from
other fields may maintain the reality of competitive incentives and cor-
rectives.
5. Agreements for cooperation within or between trades and industries
to promote and maintain an actual and fair competition are in the public
interest so long as openly made with the resulting cooperation subject to
public scrutiny, so that a choice may be required between their abrogation,
or revision, or an increase of public supervision, if such agreements are
found at any time to be operating against the public interest.
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6. Monopolies and monopolistic practices should be prohibited by stat-
utes clearly defining what they are. These prohibitions should be applied to
specific cases by an administrative commission authorized to issue restrain-
ing orders, with the statutory penalties made applicable to violations of such
temporary or final orders, made in conformity with the procedural and
substantive requirements of the law.
7. Without unduly postponing or denying any necessary resort to the
courts to prevent and punish wrongdoing, every practical method should
be employed to insure an administrative investigation and application of the
law prior to judicial proceedings of a punitive or remedial character. This
would not only relieve the courts of many undesirable responsibilities, but
should also promote consistency and certainty in the obligations imposed on
business.
8. Unfair competitive practices should be prohibited by statutes clearly
defining them as to methods and objectives. These prohibitions should be
applied and enforced by the administrative commission in the same manner
as prohibitions of monopolistic practices.
9. The developing field of trade agreements should be supervised by
an administrative agency charged with the duty of maintaining the laws
against monopolistic and unfair trade practices, but authorized to sanction
agreements clearly within the law or within any twilight zone, subject to the
rights of public or private objectors to submit a complaint to the administra-
tive commission for a decision, which like all commission orders would be
subject to judicial review.
The meaning and application of these dogmatic conclusions might be
clarified by many examples. But it is sufficient for the present purpose
merely to point out the purposes of the substantive law outlined and the
reasons for advising the enforcement procedures which are suggested.
In the first place, in this day of large business organizations and the in-
evitability of consolidations, interlocking controls, and cooperative agree-
ments of infinite variety, there should be a clear legal distinction between
mere size and actual monopolistic power, and also between the possession of
power that may be abused and the actual abuse of power. It is, for example,
illogical and indefensible to prohibit a corporation from absorbing a com-
petitor, whereby the better integrated combination can more effectively com-
pete with a powerful rival, and at the same time to sustain the right of this
powerful rival to crush its competitors one by one by its financial power,
its control of a natural resource or a patent, or by cutthroat and unfair
competition. If we are seeking to prevent the growth of a monopoly we
should not direct intelligent governmental action toward stopping any spade
work and cultivation of the soil in which a monopoly might grow; but we
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
should direct our action against those who are actually raising a monopoly
plant and against all the methods used for that purpose.
Such an effort can never be successful by attempting the judicial enforce-
ment of the sweeping prohibitions of the Sherman Act 1 -nor even by
supplementing that Act with prohibitions of interlocking directorates and
price discriminations. Monopolistic practices can be observed and defined
without great difficulty when we once accept the simple fact that we are
seeking to maintain, and to prevent the destruction of, competition-an
objective which, by the way, is not even mentioned in the Sherman Act.
An administrative commission, guided by legislative standards and
invested with the duty of preventing either the destruction of competition
or the use of unfair methods of competition, should be expected to develop
a body of legal restraints which, with judicial sanction, would eliminate
monopolistic and unfair practices in trade and industry. But this should
be accomplished without constantly impeding the natural growth of enter-
prises, and without hampering every effort of businessmen to increase the
security of both capital and labor by eliminating needless wastes of compe-
tition, while moving steadily under competitive pressures toward the most
efficient methods and mechanisms of production and distribution.
It can hardly be contended in this day that either the consumer or the
worker has been benefited by the hopeless struggle of many small business
units to survive against larger, more efficient enterprises. But on the other
hand where the small unit is equally efficient, or has a service to perform of
special value, and would survive in a field of fair competition, it needs and
should receive protection against any oppressive or unfair practices of a
more powerful competitor. Such protection cannot be obtained in the courts
and must be sought from an administrative commission adequately empow-
ered to render prompt and efficient assistance.
It will be noted that in the developing field of trade agreements I have
suggested the supervision of an administrative agency to give a prima facie
sanction to cooperative agreements. The question may naturally arise
as to the need or wisdom of delegating this function to a separate
agency, instead of conferring it upon the enforcement commission. This
separation of functions is, however, to my mind vital in any comprehensive
revision of our laws determining the relations between business and govern-
ment. When business men approach their government for the purpose of
promoting a cooperative program they should go to an agency primarily
interested in promoting such cooperation. They should not be required to
go to the prosecuting arm of government to obtain a promise of immunity.
They should not be regarded as incipient wrongdoers inviting a rebuke and
11. 26 STAT. 2O9 (1890), is U. S. C. A. §, (xg ).
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a warning, or seeking to wheedle out of the prosecuting attorney an assur-
ance that he will look leniently on their offense.
But it is inevitable, if such cooperative proposals are presented to the
commission charged with the duty of prosecuting wrongdoers, that the
commission must, in order to protect the integrity of its position in many
pending cases, be exceedingly cautious in sanctioning any agreement that
may be subsequently the cause of a complaint. Furthermore, later com-
plainants will naturally feel that the case has been prejudged against them.
Whereas if the complaint is sustained the parties to the agreement will be
aggrieved at this apparent reversal of opinion by the body on whose approval
they had relied.
For these and many other reasons, which will present themselves to
any careful student of the problem, it is my strong conviction that there are
three parts to any adequate program for revision of the anti-trust laws:
First: Rewrite the substantive law and procedure to express clearly
a national economic policy that is consistent and sensible and appropriate
for an industrial nation of the twentieth century.
Second: Establish an adequately implemented commission to apply and
to enforce the law against monopolistic and unfair practices, with appropriate
provision for judicial review of its orders.
Third: Establish an administrative agency authorized to apply the
legislatively defined policy in encouraging and aiding business men to cooper-
ate in improving the fairness and efficiency of industrial methods. Author-
ize this agency to give a temporary sanction to any such cooperative agree-
ments which do not violate any of the legal prohibitions of monopolistic
or unfair practices. Provide for the review of such sanctions by the
enforcement commission upon complaint of the government, or of any
competitor, or other person alleging injury as a result of the approved
agreement.
In conclusion let me state that I do not believe that any law which
has been enacted in the last fifty years, beginning with the Sherman Law 12
and including the National Industrial Recovery Act,13 has provided any
comprehensive or even temporarily adequate solution for the problem of
regulated competition. We began with a sweeping prohibition of combina-
tions and conspiracies in restraint of trade. The courts are still trying to
interpret and apply that original law; and no one yet knows what it means,
or what can or cannot be lawfully done under its vague commands. We
have built a superstructure of unintelligible laws and confusing judicial
opinions upon this original floating foundation.
12. Ibid.
13. 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. §6o7; 15 U. S. C. A. §6og (b) ; 23 U. S. C. A.
§ g (b) ; 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 55, 901-903, 940 (a) ; 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 401-414 (Supp. 1935).
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We experimented for two years with what some called "industrial self-
government" and others called "governmental meddling", and long before
the end we learned that neither business men nor government officials knew
what they wanted to do, except that everybody wanted to do the other fellow
good and wanted the other fellow to let him alone. We can go on flounder-
ing a few years longer-or we can take advantage of a period of compara-
tive calm and security to counsel together and try to think part way through
this most vital problem of the relations between government and business.
